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Abstract – Seamless integration of wireless sensor networks (WSN) with conventional IP-based networks is a very important basis 
for the Internet of Things (IoT) concept. To realize this goal, it is important to implement the IP protocol stack into a WSN. A global 
IP-based network is currently going through a transition from IPv4 to IPv6. Therefore, IPv6 should have priority in the implementation 
of the IP protocol into WSN. The paper analyses the existing security threats and possible countermeasures in IPv6-based WSNs. It 
also analyzes the implementation of a unique security framework for IPv6-based WSNs. The paper also analyzes a possible intrusion 
detection system for IPv6-based WSNs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are currently going 
through their intensive development and worldwide 
spreading. Intelligent sensor nodes tend to vastly out-
number other networking enabled devices in future [1-
3]. Further development of WSNs naturally leads to their 
interconnection and integration with conventional net-
works, mostly based on TCP/IP protocol architecture. The 
implementation of IP protocol into WSNs was previously 
considered inappropriate due to their strict resource limi-
tations, which resulted in numerous non-interoperable 
solutions. Currently, there are significant efforts to imple-
ment the IP protocol into a WSN, since it leads to their 
seamless integration into the global IP network.
Simultaneously, the global IP network started with 
gradual transition to the IPv6 protocol that should en-
tirely replace the IPv4 protocol in future [4-5]. Conse-
quently, regarding the implementation of the IP proto-
col into the WSN, the focus is on version 6 (IPv6) prior to 
version 4 (IPv4). The IPv6 protocol provides enormous 
address space, auto-configuration mechanisms and 
extensibility, what is very suitable for networks with a 
large number of nodes (such as WSNs). The implemen-
tation of the IPv6 protocol into WSNs enables their sim-
ple integration and convergence with the global Inter-
net, what extends their application possibilities. Such 
integrated network that satisfies demands on flexibil-
ity, scalability and robustness represents an important 
foundation for the Internet of Things (IoT) concept [6].
Security aspects of the IPv6-based WSN are very 
important. Adequate solutions of security issues are 
decisive for their wider acceptance and further inte-
gration with other IP networks. IPv6-based WSNs have 
certain specificities that disable direct implementation 
and utilization of the existing security solutions known 
from IPv6 networks and conventional sensor networks. 
Therefore, thorough adaptation of the existing security 
solutions and development of novel ones with full sup-
port for IPv6 are required. These solutions must fit into 
a unique security framework for the IPv6-based WSN in 
order to achieve their synergy and common effect.
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This paper reviews important aspects of the IPv6 pro-
tocol implementation into WSNs. Further, it analyzes 
security aspects of IPv6-based WSNs (types of attack 
and possible countermeasures). It also analyzes a pos-
sible implementation of a unique security framework 
for IPv6-based WSNs. A short overview of an intrusion 
detection system for IPv6-based WSNs is given. Finally, 
some conclusions and directions for future develop-
ment are given.
2. IPV6 PROTOCOL IN WSN
During the nineties it became obvious that some 
problems with the IPv4 protocol (e.g., address space 
exhaustion, security issues, complex configuration, and 
routing table enlargement) will even increase in the 
future. This fact initiated development of the IPv6 pro-
tocol that brings some important improvements (e.g., 
128-bit address space, a fixed-length simplified header, 
auto-configuration mechanisms and security improve-
ments). Currently, the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 is a 
long-lasting ongoing process.
A WSN consists of a large number of inexpensive sen-
sor nodes capable of sensing, basic data processing and 
wireless communication with other nodes. Although it 
is a special subtype of mobile ad hoc networks (MA-
NET), most of the existing technical and algorithmic 
solutions known from MANETs are inapplicable directly 
into WSNs because of their resource limitations. Thus, 
a WSN usually implements some alternative solutions 
(different from a MANET) and avoids the IP protocol.
Since the implementation of the IP protocol stack 
into a WSN is an important prerequisite for their eas-
ier integration with other networks, IETF established 
certain working groups to contribute to this goal. The 
6LoWPAN working group (IPv6 over Low-power Wire-
less Personal Area Network) defined a necessary adap-
tation layer that enables implementation of the IPv6 
protocol into the WSN protocol stack [7]. Frame size 
used at the WSN physical layer is usually much smaller 
than in conventional IP networks. The 6LoWPAN ad-
aptation layer enables adaptation of the IPv6 data-
gram for transmission within IEEE 802.15.4 frame. The 
6LoWPAN standard defines the frame format, address 
auto-configuration methods and the forming of link-
local addresses in networks based on the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard, since it is currently the most common stan-
dard used for physical and MAC layers in the WSN. IPv6 
header compression methods are specified for resource 
savings and easier transfer over IEEE 802.15.4 links [8]. 
The use of acknowledgements for received packets can 
be used as an option. The IEEE 802.15.4 frame has only 
127 bytes at the physical layer. It is quite small for a full 
IPv6 packet, since without any compression methods 
and with AES encryption used, it leaves only 33 bytes 
available for the application layer data. Consequently, 
for larger data, fragmentation would be unavoidable, 
and additional resources would also be consumed. The 
6LoWPAN adaptation layer defines header compres-
sion methods, both for IPv6 and UDP headers. In a best-
case scenario (local unicast communication), the IPv6 
and the UDP header can be compressed to 6 bytes.
The implementation of the IPv6 protocol into a WSN 
also requires an adequate solution for a routing proto-
col. The IETF working group ROLL (Routing Over Low-
power and Lossy networks) specified a novel Routing 
Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) 
suitable for WSNs and other types of low-power lossy 
networks [9]. It is the first routing protocol suitable for 
WSNs that implements full IPv6 support. RPL is a modu-
lar protocol, with the mandatory core part and optional 
features that depend on a particular application. Cur-
rently, it is a routing protocol recommended for use in 
the IPv6-based WSN.
3. SECURITY ISSUES IN IPV6-BASED WSN
The open nature of the communication medium 
makes security issues in wireless networks even 
more challenging than in wired ones. Thus, securing 
mobile ad hoc networks is often a more complex task 
than securing a wired network. Although WSNs are a 
special subtype of MANETs, there are some significant 
differences that prevent direct implementation of 
MANET security mechanisms into a WSN. Compared 
to a typical MANET, a WSN may have a significantly 
larger number of nodes that are prone to failures 
and strong resource limitations. A WSN is usually 
based on broadcasting, while point-to-point links still 
predominate in MANETs. These differences make WSNs 
more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. Weak 
WSN computational resources also inhibit the wider 
use of cryptographic techniques based on a public key 
(asymmetric cryptography). Therefore, in most cases, 
the implementations are constrained to the use of 
symmetric cryptographic techniques (based on private 
keys) for the application in WSNs [10-11].
Ensuring physical security for every sensor node 
in a WSN would be very expensive and in opposition 
to the basic premise of a WSN as a network of cheap 
intelligent nodes. Therefore, research focus is on dif-
ferent detection and prevention methods for attacks 
that do not involve attacker’s physical contact with 
sensor nodes or the base station. Possible attacks on 
WSNs can be categorized according to different crite-
rions. The attacks originating from nodes that are not 
members of the targeted network are outsider attacks, 
while insider attacks are initiated by former legitimate 
nodes that became compromised by the intruder and 
begun to behave maliciously [12-13]. Also, attacks can 
be classified as passive (eavesdropping and data track-
ing) and active (include data modification). The attacks 
in a WSN can be focused on different security premises: 
confidentiality, authenticity, network availability (deni-
al-of-service attacks) and data (or service) integrity. The 
attacks can also be observed according to a specific 
layer of the layered networking model they focus on 
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[14]. Most of the security aspects of WSNs are not di-
rectly related to the network layer and do not depend 
on the network layer protocol version. Therefore, both 
IPv6-based and conventional WSNs are vulnerable to 
attacks focused on other layers with no significant dif-
ference. Nevertheless, the implementation of the IPv6 
protocol as the network layer protocol has an indirect 
impact on security aspects of other network layers. It is 
manifested through the fact that currently the choice 
of IPv6 as the network layer protocol in WSNs narrows 
a possible set of protocols and technologies which can 
be used on other layers. Fortunately, proper adapta-
tions and support for the IPv6 protocol are being in-
tensively developed and therefore most protocols and 
technologies used in WSNs will certainly support IPv6 
as a network layer protocol in near future.
3.1. ATTACKS ON PHYSICAL LAYER
The attacks targeted to the physical layer are jamming 
and tampering. In a jamming attack, the attacker uses 
his own transmitter to cause interference on WSN’s 
operational frequencies intentionally. Since in most 
WSNs only one channel is used for communication, 
they are very vulnerable to jamming attacks. The 
implementation of advanced methods for interference 
avoidance would significantly increase sensor node 
complexity, price and energy consumption, which is 
mostly unacceptable. A jamming attack is not related 
to the protocol stack, so both conventional and IPv6-
based WSNs are equally vulnerable to this type of 
attack. It is also the case for a tampering attack. In most 
WSNs, nodes are exposed to tampering since they 
principally do not have physical protection. Therefore, 
security mechanisms for WSNs have to predict a 
possible compromise of certain nodes, and implement 
a mechanism for their exclusion from the network.
3.2. ATTACKS ON DATA LINK LAYER
The data link layer in WSN network architecture is 
responsible for dataflow multiplexing, data framing, 
medium access and error control. It enables reliable 
point-to-point and point-to-multipoint connections 
within a WSN. Possible attacks on the data link layer are 
primarily focused on intentional collision causing and 
resource exhaustion.
If two or more nodes within a transceiver range try 
to simultaneously transmit at the same frequency, col-
lision occurs and causes packet loss. Unfortunately, 
the attacker may cause collisions intentionally during 
transmissions of data or acknowledgements. Such at-
tack is not difficult to detect, but it is very difficult to 
prevent it. If collision occurs, nodes repeatedly try to re-
transmit lost packets, what may lead to power resource 
exhaustion. Resource exhaustion by retransmission can 
be reduced by limiting the allowed frequency of me-
dium access and by using time-division multiplexing 
[15]. Both IPv6-based and conventional WSNs are vul-
nerable to these attacks with no significant difference 
since they are not related to higher level protocols.
3.3. ATTACKS ON NETWORK LAYER
The network layer in WSNs must satisfy some impor-
tant principles (e.g., energy efficiency) that have a sig-
nificant impact on design of networking mechanisms 
(e.g., a routing mechanism). Some complex networking 
mechanisms important for proper network operation 
(e.g., routing or addressing) are running at the network 
layer. Therefore, the network layer is mostly exposed to 
various types of possible attacks.
A large number of network layer attacks target on the 
routing mechanism. They are oriented towards routing 
information exchanged between sensor nodes. The at-
tacker may spoof or alter routing data, such as repeat 
sending of data captured earlier in order to disrupt 
the normal network dataflow. In this way, the attacker 
can intentionally create routing loops, attract or repel 
network traffic, change original routes, generate false 
alerts or intentionally increase delay. A message au-
thentication code may be used as a possible counter-
measure against spoofing and unauthorized modifica-
tion of routing messages. In that case, the receiver may 
verify message integrity and sender authenticity. The 
use of counters and timestamps may prevent unau-
thorized repetition of older messages by the attacker.
Most WSNs use the multihop communication para-
digm, assuming that all intermediate nodes will fairly 
forward received messages toward their destination. 
This assumption is often misused by the attacker, 
where in most cases the attacker selectively forwards 
packets. The simplest case of a selective forwarding 
attack is the situation where a malicious node refuses 
to forward any packet (all packets are dropped). This 
variant of a selective forwarding attack is usually called 
black hole attack. However, a black hole attack is easier 
to detect than other types of selective forwarding. This 
kind of malicious behavior can usually be detected by 
neighboring nodes if an adequate intrusion detection 
mechanism is implemented into the WSN. If a black 
hole attack is detected, routes should be reconfigured 
in order to exclude malicious nodes.
A more sophisticated attack is the case where a ma-
licious node selectively forwards some packets (while 
some are dropped). The attacker discards or modifies 
packets from certain nodes. Simultaneously, the at-
tacker regularly forwards packets from some other 
legitimate nodes. Such behavior makes a selective for-
warding attack difficult to detect, since neighboring 
nodes will hardly be suspected of malicious behavior. 
In most cases of selective forwarding attacks, the at-
tacker is one of the intermediate nodes on the route to 
the destination (i.e., a base station). Also, it is possible 
that the malicious node is not directly on the route, but 
in the neighborhood of the intermediary node. In that 
case, the malicious node monitors the neighboring 
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dataflow and uses its transmitter to cause intentional 
collision with packets that it tends to drop. A possible 
countermeasure against selective forwarding attacks is 
the use of multiple routes between source and destina-
tion nodes.
The attack where a malicious node attempts to at-
tract all traffic from the network (or at least one part of 
the network) is usually called the sinkhole attack. It is 
usually achieved by falsifying routing data (e.g., the at-
tacker advertises quality routes to the base station, and 
encourages neighboring nodes to send their packets 
to the malicious node). Therefore, the malicious node 
acts like a sinkhole for all traffic from its surrounding. 
A sinkhole attack most frequently occurs in combina-
tion with a selective forwarding attack. Good practice 
in the prevention of sinkhole attacks is the use of exact 
information about the node’s geographical location in 
the routing mechanism. Unfortunately, obtaining exact 
node positions usually implies the implementation of 
some positioning system (e.g., the GPS), which increas-
es the complexity and costs of sensor nodes. Therefore, 
most routing protocols reckon on the exchange of 
routing data between sensor nodes instead on precise 
location data. Afterwards, an additional problem in the 
IPv6-based WSN is a lack of a geographical routing pro-
tocol with support for the IPv6 protocol.
In most attack scenarios, the attacker utilizes one or 
more devices with significantly larger resources than 
the average sensor node (usually laptop computers). 
These devices enable him to perform even more com-
plex attacks. The attacker most frequently uses two 
devices to establish a fast low-latency link (tunnel) be-
tween two distant parts of the network (usually called 
a wormhole). By virtue of that tunnel, the attacker 
can convince distant nodes that they are close to the 
base station and in this way disrupt the network rout-
ing mechanism. The attacker creates the sinkhole in a 
distant area of the WSN, which attracts complete traf-
fic from legitimate nodes since the attacker advertises 
a quality route to the base station (better than alter-
native legitimate routes). Since the wormhole attack 
is usually combined with other types of attacks (e.g., 
eavesdropping, selective forwarding), it can be very 
hard to detect it. Special additional markings can be 
used for every packet as a possible countermeasure 
against the wormhole attack. Geographical data can be 
used to limit the maximum distance allowed between 
the sender and the receiver, while temporal data can 
be used to limit the maximum packet lifetime [16]. Un-
fortunately, a positioning system is necessary for ensur-
ing geographical data, and the application of temporal 
markings requires strict time synchronization between 
sensor nodes, which leads to a more complex and ex-
pensive WSN.
The attacker can also steal the identity from a legiti-
mate node and misrepresent itself to other nodes. It is 
possible that the attacker uses several different iden-
tities at the same time, while he can present itself as 
several new nodes or steal the identity of the existing 
nodes. This type of attack is called a Sybil attack and 
it is already known from peer-to-peer and mobile ad 
hoc networks [17]. Therefore, it is good security prac-
tice to forbid addition of new sensor nodes into a WSN 
after setup (except if it is really necessary, depending 
on particular WSN applications). The Sybil attack has 
the largest impact on routing distributed data stor-
age. The attacker can achieve that ostensibly multiple 
routes actually pass through a single malicious node 
(with multiple identities). The Sybil attack can seriously 
harm the data aggregation mechanism (frequently 
used in a WSN due to resource savings) by inserting 
fake data. Actually, the Sybil attack may affect all WSN 
mechanisms based on distributed algorithms and col-
laboration between nodes (e.g., some types of intru-
sion detection systems). Possible countermeasures for 
the Sybil attack must include a mechanism for node 
identity verification. It usually connotes the use of cryp-
tographic methods. In that case, it is necessary to use 
proper mechanisms and techniques for cryptographic 
key distribution and management. A frequently used 
method is key pre-distribution during network setup. 
Therefore, every node gets a certain number of keys 
deployed so that neighboring nodes can find (or cal-
culate) a common shared key. It is desirable to imple-
ment a key management mechanism that supports 
additional key exchange and key revocation in case of 
node compromise.
Most routing protocols for WSNs use broadcasting of 
control messages for routing data exchange between 
nodes (e.g., nodes inform their neighbors about their 
status by broadcasting HELLO messages). Such mecha-
nism can be easily misused by the attacker. The attack-
er can use a laptop computer for broadcasting control 
messages with transmission signal power much higher 
than legitimate nodes. In this way, the attacker can 
easily cover the whole network area and persuade le-
gitimate nodes that he is their neighbor. However, the 
malicious node is not in range of legitimate nodes, so 
they try vainly to send their packets. This type of at-
tack is usually designated as a flooding attack, and may 
have a serious impact on all networking mechanisms 
that reckon on data exchange between neighboring 
nodes. A possible countermeasure can be to obligato-
rily check for link bidirectionality before data exchange. 
Also, a possible solution can be implementation of a 
neighbor authentication mechanism, usually based on 
cryptographic techniques.
3.4. ATTACKS ON TRANSPORT LAYER
Similarly to conventional networks, the transport layer 
in a WSN is responsible for handling end-to-end connec-
tions. There are some security threats that directly affect 
the transport layer. Since the transport protocol has to 
maintain a connection, a typical method for connection 
disruption is resource exhausting by flooding. For every 
connection, a destination node has to allocate certain re-
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sources. If the attacker floods his target with connection 
requests, all resources will be exhausted and unavail-
able for legitimate connection requests. It is extremely 
difficult to prevent this attack. A possible measure that 
can slow down the attacker in exhausting resources is 
to define a specific task (a computational problem) that 
the node has to solve (calculate) before the connection 
is established. Unfortunately, such approach addition-
ally consumes resources of legitimate nodes, and is not 
effective if the attacker has significantly larger resources 
than the average sensor node. The attacker can also dis-
rupt the established connection by sending false error 
messages and demands for retransmission, forcing le-
gitimate nodes to spend their resources on unnecessary 
transmissions. As a possible solution, it is recommended 
to implement authentication mechanisms that could 
authenticate every single packet.
3.5. ATTACKS ON APPLICATION LAYER
Some existing attacks in WSNs are targeted directly 
towards the networking model application layer. Over-
whelm attack connotes the attacker’s attempt to ex-
cessively stimulate a sensor on network nodes. In this 
way, the attacker increases the amount of transferred 
data causing also an increase in consumed power and 
networking resources. The impact of this attack can be 
reduced by implementing efficient data aggregation 
algorithms and limiting the frequency of sending data 
to the base station.
Most sensor nodes used in sensor networks support 
remote reprogramming (over the network), without 
the need for direct physical access. It makes network 
management and administration much easier and 
comfortable (especially in large networks), but it could 
be a serious security problem. If the attacker success-
fully reprograms the nodes, he can take control over 
the whole network. Therefore, security practice is rec-
ommended to disable the possibility of remote pro-
gramming if it is not really indispensable.
The attacks and security threats analyzed, including 
possible countermeasures, are summarized in Table 1.
4. SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR IPV6-BASED WSN
A large variety of possible application scenarios for 
wireless sensor networks (e.g., military, industrial, agri-
cultural and environmental applications) makes their 
security aspects extremely complex. It is primarily 
because different applications have different security 
requirements and demands. Therefore, it is difficult to 
develop a general security solution suitable for all ap-
plications. Consequently, it is desirable to develop and 
implement solutions that are adaptive and modular, in 
order to be able to suit application security demands. 
On the other hand, implementation of quality security 
mechanisms into a WSN improves their overall secu-
rity and opens possibilities for their wider acceptance 
and use. Most security mechanisms proposed for WSNs 
are focused on a single threat on a certain layer of the 
layered networking model. Therefore, such indepen-
dent mechanism cannot provide a desired security 
level to the end user. The desired security level could 
be reached by implementing several different security 
mechanisms that should operate cooperatively. How-
ever, it would make network installation and mainte-
nance very complicated. Thus, some research focus on 
development of integrated cross-layer security frame-
works for WSNs. Such framework integrates several 
security mechanisms and provides the end user with 
necessary security services [18-19].
Due to certain specificities of the IPv6 protocol, secu-
rity frameworks intended for conventional WSNs can-
not be directly applied to the IPv6-based WSN. There-
fore, IPv6-based WSNs require adaptation of the exist-
ing security frameworks and proposal of novel ones. In 
[20], the authors propose an integrated security frame-
work intended for the IPv6-based WSN. The proposed 
security framework includes security mechanisms re-
quired to provide basic security premises i.e., authen-
ticity, reliability, integrity and availability. The security 
framework is modular and enables the use of required 
security services and functions according to the cur-
rent application. The security framework consists of 
four security modules, i.e., cryptographic module, se-
cure routing module, secure data aggregation module 
and intrusion detection module (Figure 1).
Table 1. Attacks and possible countermeasures in 
the IPv6-based WSN
Attack Type Possible Countermeasures IPv6 influence
Physical layer
Jamming Multiple channels no
Tampering Physical protection no
Data link layer
Intentional collision Error correction codes no
Resource 
exhaustion
Time division multiplexing, 




Routing attack Message authentication code, Counters and timestamps yes
Selective 
forwarding Multiple routes yes
Sinkhole attack Routing based on location data yes
Wormhole attack Limiting packet lifetime, Use of location data yes
Sybil attack Cryptographic methods yes





Computational task before 
accepting connection no
Application layer
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The security framework follows a cross-layer ap-
proach and pervades all layers of the protocol stack. 
Security modules are interconnected in order to use 
each other’s services. The proposed security framework 
is flexible (i.e., it allows the user to choose desired secu-
rity services depending on application requirements) 
and scalable (i.e., it supports node addition or removal). 
It is also economical in resource consumption and re-
sistant to node compromise.
The cryptographic module includes two submod-
ules: the encryption submodule (provides data confi-
dentiality, authentication and integrity) and the cryp-
tographic key management submodule (responsible 
for secure key distribution, setup and revocation). Data 
confidentiality is ensured by the use of data encryption 
methods, predominantly based on secret keys (sym-
metric cryptography) due to lower resource demands. 
A message authentication code (MAC) is used for the 
purpose of authentication. In the IPv6-based WSN, the 
most common standard for the physical layer is IEEE 
802.15.4. This standard implements the AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) with 128-bit keys that can be 
used for securing messages on single links (in case of 
multihop communication, security mechanisms have 
to be applied on higher layers). The key management 
submodule deals with problems of secure initial key 
distribution, discovery of shared keys (for mutual com-
munication between pairs of nodes), path key estab-
lishment (for communication between nodes without 
a common shared key) and key revocation (in case of 
a compromise). Cryptographic techniques are usu-
ally resource demanding, which can be a problem in 
a resource-constrained WSN. Further development of 
Fig. 1. Structure of the security framework for the 
IPv6-based WSN [20]
crypto-processors and their integration within sensor 
nodes will significantly improve WSN security in fu-
ture, since hardware implementation of cryptography 
mechanisms will enable the use of more advanced 
cryptographic techniques in resource-limited sensor 
nodes [21].
The secure routing module for the IPv6-based WSN is 
based on the RPL routing protocol, as the first routing 
protocol for WSNs with IPv6 support. This module con-
sists of three blocks that perform operations of secure 
route discovery, secure route maintenance and secure 
data forwarding. The block for secure route discovery 
initially establishes multiple routes between sensor 
nodes, such as routes to the base station. The block for 
secure route maintenance performs route reconfigura-
tion in case of a topology change due to different pos-
sible reasons (e.g., node failure or node compromise). 
The block for secure data forwarding takes care of mes-
sage sending and receiving. For assuring data integrity, 
confidentiality and authentication, the secure routing 
module uses services of the cryptographic module. Cur-
rently, the RPL routing protocol is most suitable for inte-
gration into the security framework for the IPv6-based 
WSN because of IPv6 support. Accordingly, it represents 
the core of the secure routing module. It is necessary to 
preserve authentication and integrity of its routing con-
trol message (DIO, DIS and DAO messages) and prevent 
their unauthorized retransmission. The secure routing 
module receives data about detected malicious nodes 
from the intrusion detection module in order to exclude 
compromised nodes from secure routes.
Data aggregation is a very important procedure in 
large sensor networks, since it reduces necessary com-
munication and in this way saves resources and ex-
tends network lifetime. Attacks on data aggregation 
usually try to insert false data or modify aggregated 
data. Therefore, the secure data aggregation module is 
also an important part of the integrated security frame-
work. It uses services of the cryptographic module (for 
data encryption and decryption if partial aggregation 
is required on intermediary nodes). According to data 
obtained from the intrusion detection system, the data 
aggregation module can exclude data from malicious 
nodes and prevent disrupting of the final data aggre-
gation result. The secure data aggregation module ob-
tains data about the network structure and topology 
from the secure routing module. It is good security 
practice to choose an aggregation function that close-
ly follows expected sensor readings and to limit sen-
sor reading intervals. It is also recommended to discard 
minimum and maximum values before aggregation, 
such as to use the median function instead of average. 
The secure data aggregation module uses services of 
the cryptographic module to preserve data confidenti-
ality and integrity.
A very important part of the complete security frame-
work for IPv6-based WSNs is the system for detection of 
intrusions and malicious node behavior. Therefore, it is 
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implemented through the intrusion detection module 
that is analyzed in the next section.
5. INTRUSION DETECTION IN THE 
IPV6-BASED WSN
A system for detecting intrusions and malicious node 
behavior represents a very important security compo-
nent of every complete security framework. Implemen-
tation of the intrusion detection system (IDS) into WSN 
represents a great challenge due to numerous prob-
lems and limitations. Some typical problems are as fol-
lows: resource limitations (causes the need for reduced 
communication and disables the possibility of using 
the IPsec protocol and public key cryptography), vari-
ous possible security threats and attack types (denial 
of service, routing attacks, sinkhole, Sybil, wormhole, 
etc.), and key management problems.
The intrusion detection system for the IPv6-based 
WSN has to fulfil some general demands equally as in 
a conventional WSN. It should provide an automated 
mechanism for attack source identification (a mali-
cious network node), generate proper alert for the rest 
of the network and take proper preventive measures. 
Every action targeted against data, communication or 
computing resources can be considered as an attack. 
The IDS system has to distinguish legitimate network 
activities from abnormal (malicious) ones, which could 
be a serious problem, especially in larger networks. For 
that purpose, one of three different approaches is usu-
ally used: misuse detection, anomaly detection and 
specification-based detection.
A misuse detection technique compares current net-
work activities with known attack signatures (behavior 
patterns of known malicious activities). An anomaly de-
tection approach includes a learning phase, where the 
IDS learns a pattern of normal network behavior (after 
a learning phase, statistical deviations from normal be-
havior are characterized as malicious behavior). Speci-
fication-based detection combines properties of these 
two methods, and is chosen as most appropriate for the 
proposed IDS for the IPv6-based WSN in [22]. Like the 
anomaly detection technique, it also detects deviations 
from normal behavior, but it has predefined specifica-
tions that describe normal network behavior. Such ap-
proach is less resource demanding, and at the same time 
it also enables detection of novel attack types.
There are certain proposals of intrusion detection 
systems for WSNs. These proposals are very heteroge-
neous, but they can be roughly categorized into few 
categories [23] as follows: the IDS using routing pro-
tocols, the IDS based on neighbor monitoring, the IDS 
based on innovative techniques and the IDS based on 
fault tolerance. Unfortunately, most of them are inap-
plicable in the IPv6-based WSN without necessary 
modifications and adaptations. The IDS for the IPv6-
based WSN should be integrated into a unique security 
framework as the intrusion detection module (intend-
ed for detection of intrusions and malicious node de-
tection). The intrusion detection module for the IPv6-
based WSN consists of two main submodules, i.e., the 
local detection submodule and the cooperative detec-
tion submodule (Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Intrusion detection agent
Identical IDS modules (agents) are implemented on 
every wireless sensor node, executing cooperative al-
gorithms and communicating with other modules. 
Since the system is fully distributed, every network 
node monitors network traffic by using a watchdog 
technique. It is assumed that every network node 
has several neighboring nodes within the range of its 
transceiver. Accordingly, every IDS module listens to 
their neighbor’s traffic and collects data that represent 
input parameters into the collective decision-making 
process. At first sight, it seems that traffic monitoring 
by watchdog nodes will significantly increase power 
consumption. Fortunately, it is not true, since in most 
radio communication systems implemented in WSNs 
sensor nodes already receive packets broadcast from 
their neighbors. Therefore, additional power is used 
only for additional data processing and for communi-
cation between IDS modules.
The local detection submodule analyzes neighbor 
activities, and according to predefined rules, creates 
a list of possibly malicious neighboring nodes with es-
timated malevolence probabilities. All distributed IDS 
modules exchange lists of suspect nodes. The coop-
erative detection submodule makes the final decision 
about behavior character of suspected nodes. The final 
decision is a result of the cooperative algorithm that 
takes into consideration all malevolence estimations 
from all network nodes. If the final estimated malevo-
lence probability for a certain node exceeds the pre-
defined threshold value, the node will be declared as 
malicious and excluded from the network.
6. CONCLUSION
Intensive development of wireless sensor networks 
with their numerous application possibilities naturally 
requires their seamless integration with other types of 
networks. A very important step toward that goal is the 
implementation of the IP protocol stack into the WSN, 
where the focus should be on the implementation of 
the IPv6 protocol because it provides huge address 
space enabling addressing of each individual node in 
very large networks. IPv6 should also replace IPv4 in 
other IP-based networks in the foreseeable future.
Adequate solutions of WSN security aspects are very 
important for numerous applications. All security solu-
tions for the IPv6-based WSN must have full support 
for the IPv6 protocol. IPv6-based WSNs are exposed to 
many different attack types, similarly to conventional 
WSNs. Since there are differences between protocol 
stacks in IPv6-based WSNs and other types of WSNs, 
the implementation of the IPv6 protocol has an impact 
on certain attack types (depending on the targeted 
layer). Since these differences primarily refer to adapta-
tion and network layers, IPv6 protocol implementation 
mostly affects the attacks targeted towards the net-
work layer. The attacks on the network layer are similar, 
but the attacker also has to adapt his techniques for 
networking mechanisms used in the IPv6-based WSN 
(IPv6 addressing and RPL-based routing).
Security solutions used in conventional WSNs have 
to be modified and adapted with full IPv6 support im-
plemented in order to use in IPv6-based WSNs. There 
is also a requisite for new security mechanisms, devel-
oped primarily for the IPv6-based WSN. All proposed 
security solutions should fit into a unique modular 
cross-layer security framework. Only in this way their 
synergy and common effect can be achieved, and at 
the same time the user can adapt the desired security 
level to the current application requirements.
The IPv6-based network may possibly have a very 
large number of nodes. Therefore, it is important to en-
sure proper network functioning in case of some node 
failures or compromise. Accordingly, the system for de-
tection of intrusions and malicious node behavior with 
full support for the IPv6 protocol is crucial for success-
ful integration of the IPv6-based WSN into the global 
network in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
concept.
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